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I. IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
 
The identity and interests of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law 
and Equality are set forth in the Motion for Leave to File an Amicus 
Curiae Memorandum and Extension of Time to File, submitted to this 
Court on February 27, 2017.1  
II. ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED BY AMICUS 
 
Whether review should be granted under RAP 13.4(b) to consider 
if the decision of the court below conflicts with well-established 
Washington jurisprudence and if the existence of a future opportunity for 
parole, as prescribed in RCW 9.94A.730, can substitute for a juvenile 
defendant’s substantive constitutional right to have characteristics of youth 
fully considered at sentencing in light of the Eighth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution, as well as art. I, § 14, of the Washington State 
Constitution. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Amicus adopts Appellant/Petitioner’s Statement of the Case.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 Because no order has issued regarding this motion, including whether or not an 
extension to March 24, 2017, is granted, this Amicus Memorandum in Support of Review 
is timely filed in accordance with RAP 13.4(h). Because the State was granted an 
extension to file its answer by March 13, 2017, amicus has not had the opportunity to 
review or address the State’s arguments, if any, opposing review. 
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IV. REASONS WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE ACCEPTED 
 
Review is justified in this case because the decision of the Court of 
Appeals is in conflict with a decision of this Court; a significant question 
of law under the Constitutions of the State of Washington and the United 
States is involved; and the petition involves an issue of substantial public 
interest. RAP 13.4(b)(1), (3) & (4). 
A. This Court Should Accept Review Because the Court Below, by 
Following Dictum in Montgomery, Effectively Overturned this 
Court’s Holding in State v. Fain that the Constitutionality of a 
Sentence Cannot Turn on the Possibility of Parole. 
 
This Court should reverse the lower court’s holding that the 
possibility of parole afforded by the Miller fix statute, RCW 9.94A.730, 
cures Mr. Scott’s unconstitutional sentence, obviating the need for 
resentencing. State v. Scott, 196 Wn. App. 961, 971-72, 385 P.3d 783 
(2016). The court’s reliance on dictum from Montgomery v. Louisiana, 
577 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 718, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016), is misplaced 
because it is in conflict with Washington jurisprudence regarding how to 
evaluate the constitutionality of life sentences. Compare Scott, 196 Wn. 
App. at 971-72 (possibility of release by parole cures an otherwise 
unconstitutional sentence) with State v. Fain, 94 Wn.2d 387, 395, 617 
P.2d 720 (1980) (constitutionality of sentence turns on “its literal 
meaning” without consideration of possibility of release by parole). This 
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Court should accept review of Mr. Scott’s case because to allow the lower 
court’s opinion to stand would effectively overrule Washington Supreme 
Court precedent without consideration by any court.2 
i. The Montgomery Court’s Discussion of Parole Is Unpersuasive 
Dictum. 
 
Precisely how a state might comply with Miller v. Alabama, 567 
U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), was not before the 
Court in Montgomery, was therefore not fully briefed and argued, and was 
certainly not essential to the outcome regarding retroactivity. See 
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 725 (certified question was “whether [Miller’s] 
holding is retroactive to juvenile offenders whose convictions and 
sentences were final when [it] was decided”); cf. City of Seattle v. 
Holifield, 170 Wn.2d 230, 244 n.13, 240 P.3d 1162 (2010) (court's 
comments in an opinion that are immaterial to the outcome are dicta); 
State v. Halgren, 137 Wn.2d 340, 346 n.3, 971 P.2d 512 (1999) (same).  
While dicta “may be followed if sufficiently persuasive,” 
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627, 55 S. Ct. 869, 79 L. 
Ed. 1611 (1935), the dictum in Montgomery is not. In a brief paragraph 
that references a Wyoming statute, the Court uses permissive language to 
                                                        
2 Though amicus concedes that the court below could decide that Montgomery might 
abrogate this aspect of Fain, this Court should not permit the well-settled rule in Fain to 
be overruled sub silentio without full consideration by the court below or by this Court.  
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provide some guidance to the states. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736 (citing 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c)). Therefore, this Court is not bound by the 
language in Montgomery and should decline to find that the statutory 
remedy is Mr. Scott’s exclusive remedy because to do so would not 
comport with Washington jurisprudence. Cf. State v. Houston-Sconiers, 
No. 92605-1, 2017 WL 825654, at *7 (Wash. Mar. 2, 2017) (noting that 
the Supreme Court has “spoken approvingly” of a Miller fix statute only 
once, in relation to possible treatment of cases on collateral review);3 see 
In re McNeil, 181 Wn.2d 582, 589-90, 334 P.3d 548 (2014) (rejecting 
possibility of release by parole as exclusive remedy); Fain, 94 Wn.2d at 
395 (requiring that courts assess constitutionality of life sentence without 
considering possibility of parole). By taking review of Mr. Scott’s petition, 
this Court would have an opportunity to develop a constitutionally 
adequate remedy on collateral review through an adversarial presentation 
of the constitutional issues by the parties. 
 
 
 
                                                        
3 In Ramos, this Court also noted that according to Montgomery, “life-without-parole 
sentences previously imposed without proper Miller hearings may be remedied ‘by 
permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by 
resentencing them.’" State v. Ramos, ___ Wn.2d ___, 387 P.3d 650, 659 (2017), as 
amended (Feb. 22, 2017), reconsideration denied (Feb. 23, 2017) (quoting Montgomery, 
136 S. Ct. at 735). 
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ii.   The Decision Below Conflicts with State v. Fain.  
 
This Court has held that to determine whether a life sentence is 
proportionate under art. I, § 14, it should be examined on its face, without 
consideration that parole may be granted before expiration of the 
maximum term. Fain, 94 Wn.2d at 393-94. Because “‘parole is simply an 
act of executive grace’” and prisoners have no right to parole, it is not the 
same as having a shorter sentence and should not be viewed as such. Id. at 
394-95 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 293, 100 S. Ct. 113, 63 
L. Ed. 2d 382 (1980)); see RCW 9.94A.730 (parole not available if new 
crimes after 18th birthday or serious infractions in prior year; supervision 
authorized up to maximum term of sentence; if violation of parole can 
return to prison for duration of sentence). Due to the uncertainty that the 
privilege of parole will be granted or that, if granted, it will be permanent, 
its possibility should not be considered in assessing the constitutionality of 
Mr. Scott’s sentence. Fain, 94 Wn.2d at 395.   
B. This Court Should Accept Review Because Whether RCW 
9.94A.730 Offers a Meaningful Opportunity for Release Is a 
Question of First Impression and Most Other Courts that Have 
Addressed this Issue Have Not Adhered Blindly to 
Montgomery’s Dictum. 
 
 Despite Montgomery’s dictum, most courts, when faced with the 
issue, have determined that the mere fact that a juvenile offender may be 
eligible for parole does not by itself satisfy Graham and Miller. See Md. 
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Restorative Justice Initiative v. Hogan, Civil Action No. ELH-16-1021, 
2017 WL 467731, at *26-27 (D. Md. Feb. 3, 2017) (denying motion to 
dismiss and permitting plaintiffs to pursue claim that Maryland’s system 
of parole did not provide a meaningful and realistic opportunity for 
release); Hawkins v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 30 
N.Y.S.3d 397, 401, 140 A.D.3d 34 (2016) (parole board failed to consider 
the juvenile offender’s youth and its attendant characteristics); Atwell v. 
Florida, 197 So. 3d 1040, 1050 (Fla. 2016) (despite Florida’s system of 
parole, resentencing required for juvenile homicide offender); Greiman v. 
Hodges, 79 F. Supp. 3d 933, 945 (S.D. Iowa 2015) (denying motion to 
dismiss and permitting plaintiff to pursue claim that Iowa’s system of 
parole did not provide him with a meaningful opportunity for release); 
Hayden v. Keller, 134 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1010-11 (E.D.N.C. 2015) 
(finding that North Carolina’s system of parole did not provide a 
meaningful opportunity for release); Wershe v. Combs, 763 F.3d 500, 505-
06 (6th Cir. 2014) (remanding for consideration of the juvenile offender’s 
youth at the time of the crime as to whether Michigan’s system of parole 
provided a meaningful opportunity for release). Contra Arizona v. Vera, 
235 Ariz. 571, 576-77, 334 P.3d 754 (2014) (resentencing not required 
under Miller because legislature provided for possibility of release by 
parole), cited in Arizona v. Mendez, 2016 WL 2855660 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
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2016) (Montgomery v. Louisiana did not alter reasoning in Vera). 
These cases make clear that the mere existence of a system of 
parole is insufficient to satisfy Graham and Miller, notwithstanding 
Montgomery’s dictum. The court below relied solely upon the Miller fix 
statute without considering whether Washington’s system of parole 
actually satisfies Graham and Miller. 
Although the United States Supreme Court spoke approvingly of 
parole as a possible remedy for those on collateral review, the Court did 
not make clear that parole was the only possible solution. See 
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736. Washington’s Miller fix statute cannot be 
interpreted to be an exclusive remedy because it does not address the 
underlying unconstitutional de facto life sentence. See Houston-Sconiers, 
2017 WL 82654, at *8 (Miller fix statute “makes no allowance for 
consideration of any of the mitigating factors of youth that Miller requires 
at the time of sentencing”). Further, the Court stated that the Miller fix 
statute “does not resolve whether petitioners’ sentences are 
unconstitutional and in need of correction now.” Id. This Court has 
recognized the insufficiency of the statutory scheme in curing 
unconstitutional sentences that fail to account for diminished culpability in 
a number of contexts. Ramos, 387 P.3d at 659 (direct appeal of de facto 
life sentence); Houston-Sconiers, 2017 WL 825654, at *8 (direct appeal of 
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stacked mandatory enhancements resulting in long sentences). 
As the table below demonstrates, upholding the decision below 
would result in the anomaly of de facto life sentences on collateral review 
being the only category of juveniles examined thus far not to receive 
resentencing with an individualized consideration of the factors associated 
with youth. The state’s interest in finality must give way to a juvenile 
offender’s constitutional right to a sentencing procedure whereby her or 
his youth and its attendant circumstances at the time the crime was 
committed can be fully considered.  
CATEGORY OF 
JUVENILE 
DEFENDANT 
DOES MILLER 
APPLY? 
RIGHT TO 
RESENTENCING? 
OPPORTUNITY 
FOR PAROLE? 
Life without parole 
on direct appeal 
Yes – Miller, 
567 U.S. 460 
Yes – RCW 
10.95.035 
Yes – RCW 
10.95.030(3) 
Life without parole 
on collateral review 
Yes – 
Montgomery, 
136 S.Ct. at 
736 
Yes – RCW 
10.95.035 
Yes – RCW 
10.95.030(3) 
De facto life on 
direct appeal 
Yes – Ramos, 
387 P.3d at 
658 
Yes – Ramos, 
387 P.3d at 659 
Yes – RCW 
9.94A.730 
De facto life on 
collateral review 
Yes – Ramos, 
387 P.3d at 
658 
No according 
to the court 
below, but not 
yet considered 
by this Court 
Yes – RCW 
9.94A.730 
Less than life 
sentences on direct 
appeal 
Yes – 
Houston-
Sconiers, 2017 
WL 825654, at 
*1 
Yes – Houston-
Sconiers, 2017 
WL 825654, at 
*1 
Yes – RCW 
9.94A.730 
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C. The Court Should Accept Review Because Strong 
Constitutional and Public Interests Exist in Ensuring that 
Juvenile Offenders Such as Mr. Scott Have the Procedural and 
Substantive Protections Provided at Resentencing That Are 
Not Guaranteed During a Parole Proceeding.  
 
The procedural protections afforded at resentencing include the 
right to counsel, CrR 3.1(b)(2) (lawyer shall be provided at every stage of 
the proceedings, including sentencing); broader right to provide evidence, 
CrR 7.1(c) – (d) (new evidence and other reports may be furnished); and 
reviewability of the decision, CrR 7.2 (appealability of sentence). 
At a parole proceeding, there is no right to counsel,4 there is a 
limited opportunity to provide evidence,5 and the denial of parole is only 
reviewable to the extent that unlawful restraint can be demonstrated.6 As 
this Court stated in Fain, a prisoner does not have a right to release by 
parole and is instead at the mercy of executive grace. 94 Wn.2d at 394. 
Furthermore, at resentencing, a juvenile offender has a constitutional right 
to have her or his youth and its attendant consequences considered, which 
is not required during the parole process. Compare RCW 10.95.030(3)(b) 
                                                        
4 In re McCarthy, 161 Wn.2d 234, 244, 164 P.3d 1283 (2007) (finding no right to counsel 
at parole release hearing for determinate plus offender). 
5 WAC 381-60-080 (witnesses), WAC 381-60-090 (conducting a hearing), WAC 381-60-
150 (admissibility of evidence). 
6 In re Dyer, 164 Wn.2d 274, 285, 189 P.3d 759 (2008) (must show unlawful restraint to 
succeed on a PRP challenge of an ISRB decision). 
 
 
 
 10 
(sentencing court must consider “mitigating factors that account for the 
diminished culpability of youth as provided in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. 
Ct. 2455 (2012), including, but not limited to, the age of the individual, the 
youth's childhood and life experience, the degree of responsibility the 
youth was capable of exercising, and the youth's chances of becoming 
rehabilitated”) with RCW 9.94A.730(3) (no reference to youth or Miller in 
its list of considerations for release by parole).  
V. CONCLUSION  
 
For the foregoing reasons, The Korematsu Center respectfully 
urges the Court to grant Mr. Scott’s petition for review to decide this issue 
of substantial public importance, to resolve any unnecessary discrepancies 
in juvenile sentencing regimes in Washington State, and to address issues 
of constitutional significance in so doing. 
DATED: March 6, 2017 
FRED T. KOREMATSU CENTER  
FOR LAW AND EQUALITY 
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